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11 Introduction
Inﬂuence is a crucial element in any decision-making institution. The role of the decision-
making rules or, more generally, institution design is to aﬀect power relations in institutions
where decisions are made.
Quantitative analysis of decision-making rules can be divided into two parts: the other
based on co-operative games and the other on non-cooperative games. Recently, there
has been a lively debate between two schools of thought on the appropriate tools and ap-
proaches that should be used to assess and design diﬀerent constitutional decision-making
rules.
Scholars of co-operative game theory apply diﬀerent power indices. They are applied
for assessing the implications of diﬀerent decision-making rules on actors’ inﬂuence in
decision-making. The considered agents have no particular preferences and form winning
coalitions which then implement unspeciﬁed policies. Individual chances of being part
of and inﬂuencing a winning coalition are then measured by a power index. By deﬁning
some desirable distribution of actors’ power the actual distribution of power can then be
evaluated. 1
The second approach uses non-cooperative game theory to analyze the impact of ex-
plicit decision procedures and given preferences over a well-deﬁned policy space.2 In this
approach, conclusions are based on equilibrium analysis. This requires more detailed infor-
mation regarding the players’ preferences. As such non-cooperative approach does not ﬁt
to design of constitutional rules but by considering several realizations of actors’ preference
conﬁgurations one is able to draw conclusions on performance of the constitutional rules.
This uniﬁed approach can also be seen as a bridge between the two distinct approaches as
it will be demonstrated later in this paper.3
1For resent applications see e.g. Laruelle and Widgr´ en (1998), Baldwin et al. (2000, 2001), Felsenthal
and Machover (2001), and Leech (2002) for recent applications of traditional power indices. Felsenthal
and Machover (1998) and Nurmi (1998) contain a more general discussion regarding index-based analysis
of power.
2See e.g. Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis (1994, 1996), Crombez (1996, 1997), and Moser (1996, 1997).
2This paper surveys diﬀerent ways to assess power relations in decision-making institu-
tions using the above mentioned distinction as the starting point. The emphasis of the
analysis is on a priori evaluation of power and hence constitutional analysis decision-making
rules. The main question posed in this part of the paper is the design of decision-making
rules, how diﬀerent ways of assessing decision-making can give advice in the design and
what kind of questions the diﬀerent approaches are able to answer.
In the latter part of the paper, we illustrate the usage of the measures in the design of
the decision-making rules of the European Union (EU), which is topical issue due to the EU
enlargement and the ongoing constitution debate. Experiences of European integration,
especially the Nice reforms in 2000, also demonstrate that the design of decision-making
procedures and voting rules belong to the most diﬃcult parts of constitutional arrange-
ments. Since the institutional arrangements and decision-making in the EU are more based
on ad hoc solutions rather than clear constitutional principles unnecessary additional costs
cannot be avoided. Moreover, as the entry of new member states requires incumbent coun-
tries’ unanimous agreement, threats of vetoing a candidate country’s entry can be used
to gain in negotiations on required reforms in institutional rules. To avoid the bias to
decision-making institutions caused by the seek of short run gains the task of the constitu-
tion is to design the institutional structure and the decision-making rules using acceptable
transparent principles that are transparent and as neutral to changes in membership as
possible.
In the following, we start presenting the tools from classical power measures. Then
we proceed to what we call the uniﬁed approach. It is based on equilibrium analysis of
the legislative phase using the constitutional rules of playing that stage. As also in this
case the main emphasis is on how well the rules work the uniﬁed approach takes several
legislation games and hence several players’ preference conﬁgurations into account. These
approaches are the applied to EU decision-making and the the results are compared.
3See Steunenberg et al. 1999, Steunenberg & Schmidtchen 2001, Napel & Widgr´ en 2002, 2003.
32 Measuring power
In this section, we survey the concepts that are often used in the design of constitutional
rules and further illustrated in our analysis.
2.1 Traditional intra-institutional approach
An often used object of studies of decision power in co-operative games is a weighted
coalitional form voting game v that is characterized by a set of players, N = f1;:::;ng,
a voting weight for each player, wi ¸ 0 (i 2 N), and a minimal quota of weights that
is needed for a passage of a proposal, q > 0. Subsets of players, S µ N, are called
coalitions, and if a coalition S meets the quota, i.e.
P
i2S wi ¸ q, it is a winning coalition.
Formation of a winning coalition is assumed to be desirable to its members, e.g. because
they can jointly pass policy proposals that are in their interest. More generally, a winning
coalition need not be determined by voting weights.4 One can conveniently describe an
abstract decision body v by taking v to be a mapping from the set of all possible coalitions,
}(N), to f0;1g, where v(S) = 1 (0) indicates that S is winning (losing). The diﬀerence
v (S) ¡ v (S ¡ fig) := ∆iv(S) is known as player i’s marginal contribution to coalition S.
Players’ marginal contributions to coalitions and hence outcomes form the basis for power
measurement in cooperative games.
To answer the question of individual eﬀect generally to all coalitions in P(N), we need
to specify, for example, a probability model for the voting process. An agent’s behaviour
is speciﬁed as a probability distribution P for players’ acceptance rates, denoting the
probabilities of a ‘yes’-vote by individual players. Particular player’s a priori power is then
taken to be his probability of casting a decisive vote, i.e. to pass a proposal that would
not have passed had he voted ‘no’ instead of ‘yes’.
As far as we are dealing with the distribution of power in one voting body the power
index approach is straightforward. Using the class of winning coalitions as the base of
4The simple dual majority rule proposed by the Commission during the inter-governmental conference
2000 serves as an example.
4analysis counts how often players are in a swing position, given the chosen probability
model. Let xi be the probability that player i favours a proposal and x a n-vector of these
probabilities called the acceptability vector (see Straﬃn 1988 for details). If we randomize
the issue of vote, acceptability vector gives the probabilities that player i belongs to an
arbitrary coalition S, i.e. the probabilities that (s)he will support the passage of a randomly
chosen proposal. Supposing that each player votes ’yes’ or ’no’ independently of each other,




i= 2S(1¡xi). If we
take the sum of these probabilities multiplied by values of characteristic function over all
possible coalitions, we will have the mathematical expectation for the value of function v.












It can be shown that the ith partial derivative of f (x1;:::;xn) is the expected value of
player i0s marginal contribution to the coalition S, where the summation is taken over the
class Vi of vulnerable winning coalitions with respect to player i in voting games. Thus












(1 ¡ xj); (1)
which can be interpreted as the expectation of an agent’s power. For the calculation
purposes we need to deﬁne the xi probabilities explicitly. To fully disregard players’ pref-
erences we adopt the independence assumption whereby probabilities xi are independently
uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. This assumption is closest to pure constitutional analysis
of voting rules. An alternative is to assume that voters are homogeneous, i.e. their accep-
tance rates to a proposal are positively correlated. This yields xi = t and t is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1].5 If we now calculate the expectation of individual eﬀect assuming
independence










n¡1 = ¯i; (2)
the Penrose-Banzhaf measure (PBM). The PBM can be interpreted as player i0s probability
of having a swing in a vulnerable coalition, i.e. in a coalition that can be turned from
winning into losing by at least one of its members. To assess relative power the PBM is












Note that swings are deﬁned using players’ positions in coalitions but the NBI gives a
player’s share of all swings as deﬁned above. This implies that the probability model that
illustrates the PBM is destroyed by normalization.6






(n ¡ s)! ¢ (s ¡ 1)!
n!
= Φi: (4)
In the classical voting power literature of institutional design, either the PBM or NBI are
more often applied than the SSI. An often heared reasoning behind this choice stems from
behind veil of ignorance argument. The PBM and the NBI consider all possible coalitions
of actors equally likely, i.e. all coalitions have have equal weight in power calculations. This
ignores among other things actors’ preferences, which can be considered as clear beneﬁt in
the design of voting rules. The SSI does not assume any particular preferences either but
it gives equal weights to diﬀerent coalition sizes from one to n if n gives the number of
actors and, moreover, all coalitions that are of equal size, say m · n, have equal weights.
One can argue that this requires more speciﬁc information than the assumptions behind
6Probabilistic interpretation of the NBI is somewhat problematic. We need to assume that players are
indiﬀerent between voting yes and no but furthermore that a vulnerable coalition is formed, each swing
within each vulnerable coalition has the same weight and that the actual swing players obtains the whole
ﬁxed value of a vulnerable coalition (for details see Widgr´ en 2001).
6the PBM or the NBI. Assuming that all coalitions have the same probability of occurrence,
like the PBM and the NBI do, can also be expressed as an abstract voting model where
all actors have 50 per cent probability of voting yes and 50 per cent probability of voting
yes. The number of yes votes is then binomially distributed with p = 1
2. This in turn gives
more weight to the middle-sized coalitions.
2.2 Inter-institutional power in co-operative approach
Inter-institutional aspects play a signiﬁcant role in the design of constitutional decision-
making rules and procedures. For instance, the EU Treaties deﬁne explicitly the actors
that are involved in decision-making and the procedures, i.e. the sequence of moves, of
how decisions are made. This also means that procedural aspects are important since the
sequence in which the main institutions act in decision-making is deﬁned as a part of the
voting rules.
In cooperative games, the traditional way to approach inter-institutional relations is to
model the procedures as composite games.
Deﬁnition 1 Let M1;:::Mn be n disjoint nonempty sets of players and let g1;:::gn be simple
games in (0;1) normalization, with player sets M1;:::Mn respectively. Let v be a non-
negative game over the set N = f1;2;:::ng Then the v-composition of n disjoint subgames




function u(S) = v (fj jgj (S \ Mj) = 1g) for S ½ M:
The composition of games can be interpreted as a division into committees or institu-
tions involved with a decision-making procedure. As a model to EU procedures composite
game approach reduces the decision-making process into one simultaneous move game. Mj:



















where we can apply the same vector of acceptance rates (x1;:::;xn) as above.
2.3 Uniﬁed approaches
As mentioned above, the non-cooperative approach serves as an alternative for investigat-
ing decision-making institutions. In the literature, the criticism towards the co-operative
approach is two-fold. First, despite to some attempts, 7 the indices cannot take strategic
inter-institutional or procedural aspects of EU decision-making into account and, second,
they do not explicitly consider players’ preferences but rather attempt to model voting
behaviour more directly for instance using acceptance probabilities 8. The latter drawback
is not, however, necessarily severe in the design of constitutional rules. It can also be seen
as a reason to support abstract cooperative approach but the former has to be taken more
seriously even in constitutional analysis.
When there are more than one decision making institutions involved or when one is
investigating the interaction between several institutions classical power index approach
faces problems as it assumes that players are voting or moving simultaneously, which is
rarely the case in decision making procedures. Consider a simple agenda setting game
where we have an institution that makes a legislative proposal to a decision making body
which either accepts or rejects the proposal. Simultaneous coalition based approach can
only use the fact that all winning coalitions must contain the acceptance of the agenda
setting institution plus a required majority in decision making institution. This approach,
however, completely disregards the fact that the agenda setter moves ﬁrst - decision making
is procedural not simultaneous. Suppose for simplicity that the agenda setter is a single
player and the passage of a proposal requires unanimous acceptance in the decision making
7See e.g. Kirman & Widgr´ en (1995) and Laruelle & Widgr´ en (2001).
8See, however Widgr´ en (1995), Hosli (2001) or Kirman & Widgr´ en (1995).
8body. Then the power index approach suggests that each player in the latter is as powerful
as the former but it is not trivially true since the agenda setter moves ﬁrst.
Partially as a reply to this critique (see e.g. Garrett and Tsebelis 1997, 1999a, 1999b,
2001) a recent literature, which attempts to combine the desirable elements of co-operative
approach and non-cooperative approach has developed. Steunenberg et al. (1999) have
proposed a framework, which explicitly describe agents’ choices in a political procedure
and (their beliefs about) agents’ preferences. They consider a spatial voting model with
n players and an m-dimensional outcome space. Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of players
and X µ Rm be the outcome or policy space. Γ denotes the procedure or game form
describing the decision-making process and q 2 X describes the status quo before the
start of decision-making. Players are assumed to have Euclidean preferences with ¸i 2 X
(i 2 N) as player i’s ideal point. A particular combination of all players’ ideal points and
the status quo point deﬁne a state of the world ». Assuming that it exists and is unique,
let x¤(») denote the equilibrium outcome of the game based on Γ and ». Steunenberg et
al. are aware of Barry’s (1980) distinction between power and luck and explicitly strive to
isolate “the ability of a player to make a diﬀerence in the outcome” (p. 362). They note
that “[h]aving a preference that lies close to the equilibrium outcome of a particular game
does not necessarily mean that this player is also powerful”. Therefore, they suggest to
consider not one particular state of the world » but many.
In particular, one can consider each ¸i and the status quo q to be realizations of
random variables ˜ ¸i and ˜ q, respectively. If P denotes the joint distribution of random











gives the expected distance between the equilibrium outcome for decision procedure Γ and
player i’s ideal outcome. Strategic power index of Steunenberg et al. (1999) is based on
the expected distance between the equilibrium outcome and its ideal point. In order to
obtain not only a ranking of players but a cardinal measure of their power, they proceed by
considering a dummy player d whose preferences vary over the same range as the preferences
9of actual players but who does not have any decision-making rights. This leads to their










However, (5) turns out to deﬁne ∆Γ
i player i’s expected success. Just like actual distance
measures success (a function of luck and power), so does average distance measure average
success. Unless one regards average success as the deﬁning characteristic of power (which
neither Steunenberg et al. nor many others do), taking expectations will only by coincidence
achieve what Steunenberg et al. aim at, namely to “level out the eﬀect of ‘luck’ or a
particular preference conﬁguration on the outcome of a game”. This point is discussed in
considerable detail in Napel and Widgr´ en (2002). There, various examples illustrate that
the StPI is a good measure of expected success but in general fails to capture power.
Under special conditions – which eliminate all strategic aspects from the StPI – there
exists a link between the StPI and the PBM discovered by Felsenthal and Machover (2001a)
(see also Napel and Widgr´ en, 2002).
The criticism towards classical power indices above does not mean, however, that the
core of the traditional power index approach, namely a player’s marginal contribution to
the outcome, is useless. For this reason, Napel & Widgr´ en (2002) propose to extend above
analysis from the simple coalition framework of a priori power measurement and the very
basic voting game to a more general framework. First, take a player’s marginal contribution
as the best available indicator of his potential or ability to make a diﬀerence, i.e. his a
posteriori power. Second, if this is of normative interest or a necessity for lack of precise
data, calculate a priori power as expected a posteriori power. Expectation can be with
respect to several diﬀerent aspects of a posteriori power such as actions, preferences, or
procedure.
In this approach, impact is relative to a what-if scenario or what Napel and Widgr´ en
(2002) call the shadow outcome. The shadow outcome is the group’s decision which would
have resulted if the player whose power is under consideration had chosen diﬀerently than
he a posteriori did, e.g. if he had stayed out of coalition S when he a posteriori belongs to
10it. In simple games, the diﬀerence between shadow outcome and actual outcome is either
0 or 1. Richer decision framework allows for more ﬁnely graded a posteriori power.
To illustrate this more in detail, let Λ = (¸1;:::;¸n) be the collection of n players’
ideal policy positions in Rm as above. An m£n matrix, having the ¸i-vectors as columns,
represents players’ ideal points. In a policy space X µ Rm, the opportunities even for
only marginal changes of preference are manifold. A given ideal point ¸i can locally be
shifted to ¸i + h where h is an arbitrary vector in Rm with small norm. Which tremble
directions it is reasonable to consider in applications will depend. Multiples of the vector
(1;1;:::;1) 2 Rm seem reasonable if the m policy dimensions are independent of each
other.
In any case, if the vector h that describes the direction of preference trembles has norm
khk and so ® = (®1;:::;®m) = h
khk is its normalized version, one can deﬁne
Di(Λ) := lim
t!0






as a reasonable measure of player i’s ex post power provided that above limit exists. This
is simply the directional derivative of the equilibrium outcome in the direction h or ®.
Other measures for the multidimensional case can be based on the gradient of x¤(¸i;¸¡i)







Using a suitable probability distribution of players’ ideal policy positions. Let us refer
to this index to as Napel-Widgr´ en index (NWI).
3 Applying power indices to the EU
113.1 Classical power indices and institution design
As mentioned above classical power indices ﬁt best in aprioristic analysis of intra-institutional
power. Within the context of the EU this means the Council of Ministers where national
interests are represented. An important question then is whether the distribution of power
treats citizens in all member states equally. To our knowledge, all existing studies on this
issue use the NBI as their power measure.
One person one vote (OPOV) principle is a cornerstone in designing democratic insti-
tutions and fair allocation of power in a federation or two-tier decision-making in general.9
In big states citizens have less power in choosing their national government than citizens
in small states. This requires that the big states are compensated in the Council voting
weights. The right compensation to ensures OPOV principle is the well known square-root
rule due to Penrose (1946). Applied to the EU Council, fair power of countries should be










where mi denotes the population of country i and ¯
¤ the fair (Banzhaf) index of power.
Laruelle & Widgr´ en (1998) pose the question whether the distribution of power in the
EU is fair. They conclude that ﬁrst of all it depends on the deﬁnition of the EU and in
their analysis they consider all possible alternatives between an association of states and
a federal state. The former is deﬁned by requiring that each member state has the same
power whereas the latter requires that all citizens regardless of their nationality are equally
powerful, which leads to the square-root rule. The alternative deﬁnitions of the EU can
be expressed as convex combinations of the two extremes. In their analysis, Laruelle &
Widgr´ en end up with the conclusion that the existing distribution of power in the Council
of Ministers does not systematically favor or unfavor any country with an exception of the
9For earlier analysis on the EU see Laruelle and Widgr´ en 1998, Sutter 2001, Widgr´ en 2001, Leech 2002.
12Netherlands that is less powerful than it should be regardless of the deﬁnition of the EU.
Using the existing distribution of power in the Council of Ministers Laruelle & Widgr´ en











which gives the revealed deﬁnition of the EU based on the distribution of power in the
Council of Ministers. The Treaty of Nice changed the distribution of power in the Council











which is quite close to OPOV principle. The enlargement to EU-27 changes the result as
the coeﬃcient of the square-root share, i.e. OPOV principle, decreases to 0.92 (see Baldwin
et al. 2001).
During the inter-governmental conference in 2000 the Swedish delegation proposed that
the re-weighting of votes in the Treaty of Nice should approximately follow the square-root
rule. The proposal was to give each Member State the number of votes that is determined
by its square-rooted population in millions multiplied by two and rounded to the closest
integer. Although power is not equal to the voting weight, this proposal quite naturally
leads to a power distribution that is very close to the square-root rule. Moreover, if votes
are determined by square-roots of populations the system is, indeed, very transparent.
There is, however, one undesirable property in weighting based on square-roots of
populations, namely it requires quite high majority threshold to avoid the possibility that a
minority of Member States is able to pass proposals. The square-root shares of populations
of the 10 biggest EU Member States sum up to 63 per cent in the EU27. The same
property holds for the decided voting weights as well. One way to exclude undesirable
winning coalitions is to introduce an additional requirement which explicitly does this.
Noteworthy, a safety-net like this has an impact on power distribution.
13The Treaty of Nice introduced a two-fold safety-net, which requires that a qualiﬁed
majority should, in addition to suﬃcient vote threshold, contain an absolute majority of
member states and represent at least 62 per cent of EU population.
In the inter-governmental conference 2000, the Commission proposed and advocated the
so-called simple dual (SD) majority voting rule in the Council. SD rule reﬂects the Union of
nations and union of citizens principle since when it is applied a legislative proposal needs
the acceptance of majority of member states and majority of EU citizens to pass. Member
states governments do not have voting weights but the rule itself determines whether a
proposal passes and the distribution of power among member states. Transparency makes
simple dual majority voting rule desirable.
The Commission proposal was designed to the Council. More generally SD rule is
typical for federal states. For instance in the U.S. the majority of states part of the
deﬁnition is reﬂected by the decision-making rules in the Senate and the majority of citizens
part in the House of Representatives. If both chambers are equally powerful, like in the
U.S., and the assessment is only interested in national distribution of power the analysis
gives the same conclusions in one and two-chamber decision-making. Table 1 gives the
summary of diﬀerences between normalized Banzhaf indices when two alternative dual
majorities are used in the Council of EU15 and EU27. The table gives the regression
coeﬃcients of the square-root rule in a simple regression presented above. In the table,
D50 refers to simple dual majority, i.e. absolute majority of states and citizens, D62
refers to absolute majority of states and 62 per cent majority of citizens10 D74 to absolute
majority of states and 74 per cent majority of citizens respectively. The alternatives SD50,
SD62 and SD74 refer to similar dual majorities where and absolute majority of member
states and 50 per cent, 62 per cent and 74 per cent majority of member states’ square-
rooted population is needed to pass legislation. Let us refer to these rules to as square-root
dual majorities.
10The choice of 62 per cent is inspired by the Nice reform, which deﬁnes the voting rules in the Council
as a mixture of voting weights and and D62 rule.
14Table 1: The regression coeﬃcient of the square-root rule and the sum of squared diﬀerences
between fair and actual power in the EU15 and EU27
Rule Coeﬃcient Sum of squared
of the sq-rule diﬀerences, ¢10¡3
EU15 EU27 EU15 EU27
D50 0.931 0.911 2.166 2.037
D62 1.051 1.071 3.588 2.690
D74 1.113 1.165 5.805 6.234
SD50 0.868 0.836 6.100 4.668
SD62 0.991 0.982 0.100 0.057
SD74 0.978 0.986 0.252 0.051
Nice 0.971 0.919 0.749 5.494
Interestingly, table 1 suggests that 62 per cent majority of square-rooted population
together with absolute majority of member states implements the square-root rule almost
exactly. In the EU27, a higher square-rooted population threshold seems to work slightly
better. In dual majorities of member states and their population a lower than 62 per cent
population quota seems to mimic the square-root rule better. As an overall conclusion, a
simple dual majority that was proposed by the Commission in IGC-2000 performs slightly
worse the voting weights agreed in Nice if the emphasis is on the coeﬃcient. The Nice
weights also imply a smaller sum of squared diﬀerences between, according to the square-
root rule, fair and actual allocation of power in the EU15 but not in the EU-27. In fact,
there is a substantial increase with this respect when Nice weights are used in the EU27
indicating that despite the better average performance the diﬀerences at individual Member
State level show worse performance.
In sum, the results in table 1 suggest that weighted voting turn out to be unstable
in fulﬁlling the square-root rule at one actor level. This is mainly due to the fact that
15determination of voting weights is based not on country characteristics like population
of one country but many. Member States are divided into clusters of countries and the
division lines are partially arbitrary. Dual majority rules can be interpreted as weighted
voting games with a safety-net which guarantees the support of an absolute majority of
member states for the passage of a proposal. Contrary to the Nice rules dual majorities have
theoretical foundations. Dual majority rule applies the deﬁnition of the EU as the union
of citizens and the union of states whereas square-rooted dual majority applies fairness
criterion for two-tier decision-making more directly.
Should we ever rely on the SSI in the design of constitutional rules. With this respect
the standard answer is no. The PBM assumes that all coalitions have the same probability
of occurrence. This supports its usage as the index, indeed, takes ’behind the veil of
ignorance’ literally.11 If the voting rules are understood as triples of voting weights, vote
thresholds and procedures this does not necessarily use all the information available in
the procedure. In uniﬁed approaches below the basis of ex ante assessment is ex post
equilibrium analysis, which makes the set-up more game theoretic and which may give
support to use the SSI as an appropriate power measure. More speciﬁcally, assuming
spatial preferences the NWI allocates power according to the SSI at intra-institutional
level. This gives theoretical support for using it.
4 Power in EU procedures
4.1 The main procedures of the EU
In composite games, it is implicitly assumed that the actors move simultaneously. 12 This
gathers dark clouds upon their applicability to EU procedures. Intuitively these measures
11See e.g. Laruelle & Valenciano 2002 for probabilistic voting model for the PBM, which leads to similar
conclusion. Felsenthal & Machover 1998 give the probabilistic interpretation to the PBM using repeated
Bernoulli experiments where each repetition is like a ’yea’ or ’nay’ vote.
12See, however, Laruelle & Widgr´ en (2001) who model the EU procedures as sequences of composite
games.
16are likely to over-estimate the power of late-movers and under-estimate the power of the
ﬁrst-mover, like the agenda setter. In the following, we investigate inter-institutional power
in the EU and the diﬀerence between the results based on composite game and uniﬁed
approaches.
The EU has three main decision-making bodies: the Commission, the Council and the
European Parliament (EP) and two main decision-making procedures: consultation and co-
decision procedure. In consultation procedure, the Commission proposes and the Council
decides. Unanimous Council can amend a Commission proposal. The Commission can also
decide to not to propose and then the legislative status quo 0 prevails. The Commission,
thus exerts agenda-setting power and gate-keeping power and the Council decision-making
power. These cannot be separated appropriately in standard cooperative analysis but our
equilibrium based analysis gives a better picture of diﬀerent powers. In our models the
Commission is assumed to be a unitary actor - national views are assumed not to play
a role.13 The Council is assumed to be a voting body of currently 15 and, after eastern
enlargement has fully taken place, 27 member states. The EP is modelled following the
standard tradition as a unitary actor as well.
The way how a cooperative coalition based model can approach the Consultation pro-
cedure is simply to deﬁne the win-sets of a game. In consultation procedure they are
² the Commission plus a qualiﬁed majority in the Council (refers to column CN1 in
tables below)
² unanimity in the Council (refers to column CN2 in tables below).
Co-decision procedure is more complicated. The main diﬀerence to consultation procedure
is is that co-decision gives signiﬁcant powers to the EP. A Commission proposal goes to
the EP to its ﬁrst reading where it can accept a proposal or amend it. In each case the
proposal, the original or amended, goes to the Council where it can be accepted or further
13For analyses where this has not been assumed, see Bindseil and Hantke 1997, Baldwin et al. 2000,
2001.
17amended. The former leads to outcome x1 and the latter to a proposal x2. That can be
then accepted, amended or rejected by the EP. This stage of the procedure also gives the
EP some agenda setting powers. A proposal x3 is then studied by the Commission. It can
reject or accept the proposal x3 but not to amend it any more. The next mover is the
Council that can accept x3 by qualiﬁed majority in the case of Commission acceptance and
unanimously in the case of Commission rejection. Note that, in fact, the Commission view
does not bind the Council at all since by over-ruling it the Council can start conciliation
with the EP. The Conciliation Committee is chaired by the Vice-President of the European
Parliament and a representative of the member state that is holding presidency in the
Council. Before the Committee meets the member state that is holding presidency has,
however, a leading role. This suggests that one alternative way to model decision-making
in the Conciliation Committee is a simple agenda-setting model where the member state
that is holding presidency in the Council makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal that has to
be accepted by an absolute majority in the European Parliament and qualiﬁed majority
in the Council. Let us refer to this model as the Presidency Model 14.
In composite game approach to co-decision procedure, we obtain two potential win-sets
as follows
² the Commission, a qualiﬁed majority in the Council and an absolute majority in the
EP (refers to column CD1 in tables below)
² a qualiﬁed majority in the Council and an absolute majority in the EP (refers to
column CD2 in tables below).
Again, it is worth noting, however that the Commission has the right to initiate or
decide to not to initiate. This gate-keeping role of the Commission means that the true
14Presidency model is not the only way to approach co-decision procedure. We use it here for the sake of
comparison to the analysis of Steunenberg & Dimitrova (1999) that applies StPI to co-decision modelled
using presidency model. For alternative approaches see Napel & Widgr´ en (2003) where co-decision is
modelled as Rubinstein’s alternative oﬀers bargaining game.
18distribution of power lies in both procedures between the two cases - with and without
amendments - and depends on preferences.
4.2 The composite game approach
Table 1 gives the inter-institutional power in the EU15 using the pre-Nice voting weights
and the PBM. Column heads CD1 and CD2 refer to co-decision procedure and CD1E
and CD2E to their respective counterparts after the enlargement. In CD1 and CD1E it is
assumed that the Commission exerts power as a member of a winning coalition and in CD2
and CD2E it is assumed that the Commission exerts only gate-keeping power (see Figure
3 above) above). Abbreviations CN and CNE stand for consultation procedure before and
after enlargement respectively. Table 2 gives the respective SSIs.
The ﬁgures in Tables 1 and 2 show that the inter-institutional balance of power is
practically not aﬀected by eastern enlargement. This conclusion is very robust regardless
of the enlargement and hence the number of new member states added. The most notable
eﬀect is two percentage points decline of the Council’s power in consultation procedure.
This is due to expanding membership as unanimous Council can amend the Commission
proposal an unanimity is harder to achieve in the EU27 than in EU15.
According to the classical power indices the Council is the most powerful actor in both
procedures. This contradicts with the standard conclusion of spatial voting games that the
Commission is the most powerful actor (e.g. Steunenberg et al. 1999) due to its ﬁrst-mover
advantage.
The results are also diﬀerent when diﬀerent classical power indices are used to measure-
ment. The SSI suggests that inter-institutional power remains practically unchanged after
the enlargement where as the PBM suggests that the enlargement has a signiﬁcant impact
on actors’ power and also to the intra-institutional distribution of power. In absolute terms,
all actors lose and the change in relative power aﬀects more the Commission or the EP
than the Council. In sum, the cooperative analysis suggests that expanding membership
may decrease all actors’ power resulting mainly from deteriorating passage probability of
19Table 2: Inter-institutional Penrose-Banzhaf power measures in the EU15 and EU27
Co-decision procedure Consultation procedure
CD1 CD1E CD2 CD2E CN CNE
Commission 0.039 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.028
Council 0.253 0.152 0.506 0.303 0.506 0.303
Parliament 0.039 0.014 0.078 0.028 0.000 0.000
Table 3: Inter-institutional Shapley-Shubik power indices in the EU15 and EU27
Co-decision procedure Consultation procedure
CD1 CD1E CD2 CD2E CN CNE
Commission 0.254 0.253 0.000 0.000 0.248 0.268
Council 0.492 0.494 0.690 0.696 0.752 0.732
Parliament 0.254 0.253 0.310 0.304 0.000 0.000
20a random proposal. In the EU-27, it is more likely that the status quo prevails than it is
in the EU-15. This does not hold, however, to the same extent if actors’ acceptance rates
for proposals are positively correlated, which is the case in the SSI. Let us next consider
inter-institutional power in strategic environment and then compare the results to those
presented above.
4.3 Strategic power in the EU
4.3.1 Consultation procedure
Let us restrict the policy space to be a unit interval where the reference point is normalized
to zero and let us denote the ideal policies in the Council by ¹ = (¹1;:::¹n): The ideal
policies of median voters in the EP and the Commission are denoted by ¼ and ° respectively.
For the sake of comparability to classical power indices let us assume that the policy space
is unit interval [0;1] Since here we are interested in inter-institutional power and not the
distribution of power in the Council we simply assume that each Council member has one
vote.15 The majority rule is m · n:
There are two alternative ways to approach the consultation procedure: the standard
model and the presidency model. In the former the Commission’s draft proposal is chal-
lenged by unanimous Council. If all Council members are either to the right or to the
left from the Commission’s ideal policy position then either left-most or the right-most
Council member is crucial for the outcome. Another modelling strategy in the literature
(see Steunenberg and Dimitrova 1999) gives a role to the member state that is holding
presidency in the Council. It is assumed that the state that is holding presidency in the
Council is able to make a proposal that makes either the left-most or right-most Council
member indiﬀerent between the Commission’s ideal policy and a proposal made by the
presidency. But knowing that the best that the Commission can do is to propose the ideal
policy outcome from the viewpoint of the left-most or right-most Council member. That
15This is the usual assumption made in spatial voting game. To our knowledge there are no studies
where strategic power is analysed in weighted spatial voting game.
21proposal cannot be beaten by any unanimous compromise. Let ¹L and ¹R denote the left-
most and right-most members of the Council. More formally, we get the following subgame









> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
¹L if ¹L ¸ °
° if ¹¤ ¸ 1
2° ^ ¹R > °
¹R if ¹¤ ¸ 1
2° ^ ¹R · °
min(¹R;2¹¤) if ¹¤ 2 (0; 1
2°)
where Ω¤ refers to the equilibrium outcome, ¹¤ refers to the ideal policy position of the
pivotal player and which is accepted by voters (n);:::;(n ¡ m + 1) and by any (n ¡
m);:::;(l), n¡m ¸ l ¸ 1; for whom (¹i ¡ Â¤)
2 · ¹2
i holds. Hence Ω¤(°;¹) = Â¤ (°;¹¤):16
This states more formally that, ﬁrst, only the spatial swing player (n ¡ m + 1) may have
an inﬂuence on the outcome and, second, he actually has an inﬂuence only for particular
preference constellations.










2° < ¹¤ < 1
0; if ¹¤ < 1
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> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
2; if ¹¤ < 1
2° ^ ¹¤ < 1
2¹R ^ ¹i = ¹¤
1 if (¹L ¸ ° ^ ¹i = ¹L)
_ (¹¤ ¸ 1
2° ^ ¹R · ° ^ ¹i = ¹R)
0; otherwise.1
2° < ¹¤ < 1
For ex ante considerations, suppose that the ideal policy positions are uniformly dis-
tributed on [0;1]. We get
16Note that the ideal point ¸(n¡m+1) of the pivotal player is unique. In qualiﬁed majority voting there






where k 2 f°;¹¤g.
4.3.2 Co-decision procedure
Here we assume that the government of a member state that is holding Presidency exerts
agenda-setting power in the Conciliation Committee. This may, however, over-estimate the
role of the Council since the meetings of the committee are co-chaired by a Vice-President
of the EP and a minister of a member state that is holding Presidency. Suppose ﬁrst that
the Presidency exerts agenda setting power in the conciliation committee. In the post-
Amsterdam version of the co-decision procedure, the Commission does not have a role in
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where ¹P refers to the ideal point of the member state that is holding Presidency ¹0
refers to the ideal point of a semi-pivotal player of a sub-game in the Council without the
government that is holding Presidency. Note that the Commission exerts only gate-keeping
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EP wields inﬂuence if ¼ < ¹0 and ¼ < 1
2¹P: The Council members have two channels to
exert power: when holding presidency and/or as a semi-pivotal player.











2; if ¼ < ¹0 ^ ¼ < 1
2¹P
0; if otherwise:












2¹P < ¹0 ^ 1
2¹P < ¼
0; if otherwise:












2¹P > ¹0 ^ ¹0 < ¼
0; if otherwise:
:







where k 2 f¼;¹;¹¤g.
4.3.3 Assessment
Let us next evaluate the procedures using the NWI and StPI presented above. Tables 4
and 5 give the strategic power indices and the eﬀects of Nice reforms on majority threshold
before and after the enlargement and the eﬀects of enlargement with under pre-Nice and
24Table 4: The eﬀects of Nice reforms and enlargement on strategic inter-institutional power
in consultation procedure
Current EU Enlarged EU Diﬀerence
CM EC CM(E) EC(E) DCM DEC
Q=71 per cent 0.813 0.531 0.744 0.592 -0.069 0.061
Q=74 per cent 0.922 0.477 0.831 0.549 -0.092 0.072
Diﬀerence 0.109 -0.054 0.086 -0.043 0.017 0.018
post-Nice quota.17 The total eﬀect can be computed either by by taking the eﬀect of
enlargement under the old threshold and then the threshold eﬀect or by taking the eﬀect
of the change in threshold and then the eﬀect of the enlargement under the new threshold.
The total eﬀects are shown on the two rightmost columns of the third row. As before EP
refers to the European Parliament, CM to the Council and EC to the Commission. In both
tables columns 2 and 3 give the pre-enlargement ﬁgures, columns 4 and 5 post-enlargement
ﬁgures and columns 6 and 7 the diﬀerences.
Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate that the Council gains in both procedures. The Commission
gains in consultation procedure and the EP loses in co-decision procedure. In both cases
the total eﬀects are very small. Note that the Commission is powerless in co-decision
procedure - it only exerts gate-keeping power. The equilibrium outcome does not depend
on Commission’s preferences unless it refuses to initiate and the legislative status quo
prevails.18
The results in tables 4 and 5 share the common property that the inter-institutional
17Here we disregard the eﬀects of the changes in intra-Council distribution of power. According to
the earlier results the power distribution within the Council does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on inter-
institutional distribution of power at the aggregate level.
18This makes the procedure ineﬃcient since not all gains from trade are realized if the Commission uses
its gate-keeping power (see Widgr´ en 2003 for details).
25Table 5: The eﬀects of Nice reforms and enlargement on strategic inter-institutional power
in co-decision procedure
Current EU Enlarged EU Diﬀerence
EP CM EP(E) CM(E) DEP DCM
Q=71 per cent 0.178 0.658 0.173 0.668 -0.005 0.010
Q=74 per cent 0.162 0.731 0.162 0.727 0.000 -0.004
Diﬀerence -0.016 0.073 -0.011 0.059 -0.016 0.069
power in the EU seems to be very stable as far as the membership is concerned. Especially
this holds in co-decision procedure where the the eﬀects are in third decimals when the
membership expands from 15 to 27. In consultation procedure the magnitude of these
eﬀects is somewhat bigger. Comparison of the impact of big enlargement to a small change
in quota from 71 to 74 per cent puts these eﬀects into perspective. In co-decision procedure,
the impact of increasing the quota from 71 to 74 per cent has a much bigger eﬀect than
the expansion of membership from 15 to 27 and in consultation procedure the eﬀects are
roughly of the same magnitude.
Let us next compare three diﬀerent approaches to measure inter-institutional power,
namely composite game approach and two variants of strategic power measures. In the for-
mer, we concentrate on the SSI. As to our knowledge there are no studies using the strategic
power index of Steunenberg et al. (1999) in evaluating post-Nice rules we concentrate on
EU15 and the majority thresholds that are currently in use.
Tables 6 and 7 give the respective results in consultation and co-decision procedures.
The ﬁrst observation in both cases is that the composite game SSI and the NWI give
qualitatively rather similar results and that the StPI diﬀers from these signiﬁcantly. In
fact, in both procedures the StPI ranks the actors diﬀerently from the composite game SSI
and the NWI. In consultation procedure, it suggests that the Commission is more powerful
26Table 6: Inter-institutional power measures in consultation procedure in the EU15
Composite game SSI Napel-Widgr´ en SPI Steunenberg et al. SPI
QMV Unanimity QMV Unanimity QMV Unanimity
Commission 0.248 0.063 0.531 0.000 0.350 0.100
Council 0.752 0.937 0.813 1.875 0.110 0.070
Sources: Columns 1-4 own calculations, columns 5-6 Steunenberg et al. (1999).
than the Council and, in co-decision procedure, that the EP exerts more power than the
Council. These diﬀerences illustrate the fundamental diﬀerence between the StPI, which
uses the average distances between outcomes and actors’ policy positions as the source of
power whereas the two other indices rely on marginal contributions.
A major diﬀerence between he composite game SSI and the NWI is that the former con-
siders the procedures as simultaneous decisions whereas the latter models the procedures
as procedural non-cooperative games. This raises the question of the ﬁrst-mover advan-
tage. In consultation procedure, the Commission is the ﬁrst-mover making a proposal but
unanimous Council can amend the proposal, which keeps the ﬁrst-mover advantage almost
completely in hands of the Commission. In co-decision procedure, the situation is diﬀer-
ent. Like the equilibrium analysis above suggested the Commission’s role is considerably
diminished. This stems from the fact that the EP and the Council apply the same quota
for acceptance of the Commission proposals and for amendments that do not require Com-
mission’s support. In the analysis we have moreover assumed that the member state that
is holding Council presidency has an initiator’s role in the conciliation committee.
Tables 6 and 7 show that in consultation procedure, indeed, the NWI gives higher power
score to the Commission than the CGSSI. In the case of the Commission the theoretical
maximum power is one in both cases. The CGSSI is based on Commission’s presence in a
winning coalition and can, therefore, be seen as a measure of Commission’s gate-keeping
power. The diﬀerence between the NWI and CGSSI illustrates, on the other hand, its
27Table 7: Inter-institutional power measures in co-decision procedure in the EU15
Composite game SSI Napel-Widgr´ en SPI Steunenberg et al. SPI
QMV Unanimity QMV Unanimity QMV Unanimity
Commission 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a.
Council 0.690 0.938 0.658 1.668 0.089 n.a.
Parliament 0.310 0.062 0.178 0.033 0.140 n.a.
Sources: Columns 1-4 own calculations, column 5 Steunenberg & Dimitrova (1999).
agenda setting power. Note that unanimity rule diminishes gate-keeping power. It is more
likely that the Commission is (on average) worse oﬀ than in legislative status quo prevails if
it compares a compromise made by a qualiﬁed majority of the Council instead of unanimous
Council to the legislative status quo. This makes the need for using gate-keeping power
(on average) less urgent under unanimity rule than in qualiﬁed majority voting.
For the Council the theoretical maximum value of the CGSSI is one and the maximum of
the NWI index is 2.19 Relative to these maxima the Council exerts less power according to
the NWI than according to the CGSSI. This is intuitively plausible since the Commission’s
gains due to its agenda setting power in the NWI. The Council’s absolute power ﬁgures
remain almost identical though.
The StPI gives diﬀerent results. It gives a higher power score to the Commission than
to the Council and both actors’ power decrease when QMV is replaced by unanimity rule.
The theoretical maxima are one for both actors. The reason for this is the fact that power
stems from a small distance between the ideal policy positions and outcomes. Unanimity
rule tends to shift the equilibrium outcome towards the extreme positions whereas under
QMV outcomes are closer to the centre of the policy space.
In co-decision procedure, the CGSSI and the NWI suggest that the Council is more
powerful than the EP whereas the StPI suggests the opposite. The latter gives, however,
19This can be seen from the equilibrium above.
28more power to the member state that is holding presidency in the Council than to the
EP. The Council’s power in the StPI column of table refers to an average Council member
assuming that each Member State has 1
15 likelihood of holding presidency. The separate
ﬁgures according to the StPI are 0.50 for the Member State that is holding presidency and
0.06 for other Council members. Also this property diﬀers from the NWI and the CGSSI,
which suggest that the Member State that is holding presidency exerts less power than the
rest of the Council the respective ﬁgures being 0.260 and 0.398.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has surveyed diﬀerent methods of evaluating actors’ power in voting games.
Our emphasis was in ex ante assessment of power. The standard tools for this are classical
power indices of co-operative games. Power indices have been criticized as they disregard
actors’ preferences, all strategic aspects and inter-institutional relationships. If power
indices are used in the design of constitutional rules the ﬁrst source of criticism does not
hit the target. The fact that power indices abstract preferences can be seen as a desirable
property when the objective is to design institutions. The two other sources of criticism
should, however, be taken more seriously. They are both closely related with the fact that
legislation and decision-making in institutions like the EU are procedural whereas power
indices are static concepts.
In power index literature, there are some attempts to capture the inter-institutional
aspects using composite game approach. As it is as static as standard coalitional form
voting games and hence power indices they do not help in explaining strategic and inter-
institutional aspects in a satisfactory way.
In the recent literature of power indices, there are several attempts to reply to criticism
towards power indices or (abstract) a priori approach in general. First wave of this liter-
ature (see e.g. Widgr´ en 1995, Kirman & Widgr´ en 1995) concentrated in making diﬀerent
assumptions concerning actors’ preferences. In power index models, this is often made by
making assumptions on players’ rates of acceptance towards a proposal or on probabilities
29of supporting a proposal. This line of research rather investigates and models diﬀerent
voting situations and, therefore, does not ﬁt to the design of constitutional rules.
Another and more recent approach stems from non-cooperative models of voting and
decision-making procedures. This uniﬁed approach is based on equilibrium analysis of the
decision-making procedure. The rules of the game are understood more widely than in co-
operative games since the explicit procedure is included. Ex ante analysis is then carried
out by randomizing actors preferences. In this line of research there are two variants:
ﬁrst the one where power is deﬁned as the expected distance between the outcome and
an actor’s ideal policy position and, second, the one where the original deﬁnition of power
as marginal contribution in coalitional form games is restored. The former approach is
limited to spatial voting whereas the latter is not.
In this paper, we used EU decision-making as an example to demonstrate how diﬀerent
approaches work. We argue that classical co-operative approach is still valid in dealing
with intra-institutional distribution of power, like in the EU Council of Ministers. Here
the usual approach relies on the Banzhaf index of power but this paper demonstrates
that the use of the Shapley-Shubik index may be justiﬁed as well. In inter-institutional
relations uniﬁed approach is more appropriate. Here the composite game approach seems,
however, give consistent picture with the marginal contribution based uniﬁed approach.
Nevertheless this picture is only partial.
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